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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This study examines some concerns that derive from
Suriname‘s May-July 2010 elections, which resulted in the
re-emergence of erstwhile military ruler and convicted drug
trafficker, Désiré (Desi) Bouterse, as President of the
Republic. The victory reflects Bouterse‘s political acumen in
aggregating disparate political interests and in establishing a
viable coalition government. But because of his history and
profile, this triumph has generated anxiety in some places
internationally. In this respect, the study examines anxieties
related to three matters: (a) relations with Guyana, where
there is an existing territorial dispute and a recently resolved
maritime dispute, (b) illegal drug trafficking operations, and
(c) foreign policy engagement with Venezuela.
There has been a flurry of bilateral activities—including
several presidential summits—with Guyana since President
Bouterse‘s inauguration, albeit seemingly more about
symbolism than substance. Although the maritime dispute
was settled by a Tribunal of the United Nations Convention
of the Law of the Sea in 2007, the 15,000 km 2 New River
Triangle is still unresolved. Indeed, in June 2011 President
Bouterse reasserted Suriname‘s claim to the Triangle.
Suriname has upped the ante in that dispute by portraying
internationally the map of Suriname as inclusive of the
disputed area. In all likelihood that self-redefinition slowly
will become the country‘s cartographic definition in the eyes
of the world if Guyana does not successfully rebuff that
move or pursue the definitive settlement of the dispute.
A geonarcotics assessment shows Suriname to be still
heavily implicated in trafficking, because of geography, law
enforcement limitations, corruption, and other factors. But
despite Bouterse‘s drug-related history and that of former
senior military officers, several reasons suggest the
inexpediency of a narco-state being created by Bouterse. As
well, as part of Suriname‘s pursuit of increased Caribbean
1

and South American engagement, it has boosted relations
with Venezuela, which has included it in PetroCaribe and
provided housing and agricultural aid. However, the
engagement appears to be driven more by pragmatism and
less by any ideological affinity with Hugo Chavez.

2

INTRODUCTION
Although Roberto Espíndola‘s analysis of Latin America‘s
contemporary political dynamics does not include Suriname,
his simple but prescient observation resonates powerfully
with that country: ―Elections in Latin America [and the
Caribbean] keep showing that the region retains its capacity
to surprise observers, as well as a potential to generate
expectations.‖1 Suriname‘s 2010 elections surely had
surprising outcomes, the most significant of which was the
re-emergence of Désiré Delano (Desi) Bouterse as national
leader, this time through democratic means.
Bouterse‘s re-emergence has both local and foreign
implications. Internally, it has generated hopes about
political unity and improved quality of life, among other
things. Externally, it has raised geopolitical anxieties because
of his colorful history and unenviable profile: a two-times
coup-maker and authoritarian ruler (1980-1987; 1990-1991);
the only world leader with the dubious distinction of an 11year prison sentence for drug trafficking, issued in absentia
by a Dutch court, with extradition foreclosed because
Suriname and Holland lack mutual extradition treaties; and
defendant (along with others) in a domestic trial for ordering
the murder of 15 political opponents in 1982.
Thus, more than any other Caribbean nation except Haiti
(and a few Latin American ones) that held elections within
the last decade, Suriname‘s electoral outcomes situate it at a
noteworthy historical juncture. This juncture has fascinating
internal and external elements, reflecting, in theoretical
terms, both Political Adaptation and Intermestic dynamics.2
1

Roberto Espíndola, ―New Politics, New Parties?‖ in eds. Richard L.
Millett, et al. Latin American Democracy: Emerging Reality or
Endangered Species? (New York: Routledge, 2009), 141.
2
See Huntington 1968 regarding Political Adaptation. See Manning 1977
for the initial use of Intermestic, and Lowenthal 1992 for the first
application in relation to Latin America and the Caribbean.
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In order to appreciate some of the adaptation and dynamics it
is important to examine a few contestation issues and some
of the anxieties that have surfaced because of the results of
the contestation.
POLITICAL
CONTESTATION
AGGREGATION

AND

INTEREST

In 1996 the late Gary Brana-Shute, Cultural Anthropologist
and Suriname-expert, noted the following in a study on
Suriname‘s civil-military relations: ―Can we expect any
more coups in Suriname? No, I am absolutely sure of that.
Will Bouterse and his allies go away? No, I am very certain
of that too, now that they have well-funded political
machine—the NDP—that has surprisingly wide support.‖ 3
Thus, he was eerily prophetic. Not only did Bouterse not go
away, but he returned in 2010 to the pinnacle of political
power, and this time legitimated through a key democracy
factor: elections. I attribute a significant aspect of this
outcome to his political acumen in (a) exploiting the
country‘s political vicissitudes and (b) aggregating various
political interests to deliver De Mega Combinatie (Mega
Combination) as a coalition force. And, by political acumen I
mean the use of a mixture of shrewdness, charisma, and
organizational skills to gain political outcomes both for him
and the individuals and groups whose interests he aggregates
and represents.
In terms of political system, Suriname is a constitutional
republic, with an executive branch headed by a president, a
51-member unicameral legislature called the National
Assembly that is popularly elected for five-year terms on the
basis of proportional representation, and a judiciary. The
president is elected for a five-year term by a two-thirds
majority of the National Assembly or, failing that, by a
3

Gary Brana-Shute, ―Suriname: A Military and Its Auxiliaries,‖ Armed
Forces and Society, Vol. 22, No. 3, Spring: 1996, 482.
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majority of the People's Assembly. If at least two-thirds of
the Assembly cannot agree on a candidate, a People's
Assembly is formed from all National Assembly delegates
and regional and municipal representatives who were elected
by popular vote in the most recent national elections. A vice
president, normally elected at the same time as the president,
needs a simple majority in the National Assembly or People's
Assembly to be elected for a five-year term. The president
serves as head of state and head of government. He is
supreme commander of the armed forces and chairs the
National Security Council.4
The May 25, 2010 elections were contested by seven
political parties:
AC
A Combinatie (A Combination)
BVD Basispartij voor Vernieuwing en Democratie (Basic
Party for Renewal and Democracy)
MC
Mega Combinatie (Mega Combination)
NDP Nationale Democratische Partij (National
Democratic Party)
NFDO Nieuwe Front voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling
(New Front for Democracy and Development)
PDOE Partij voor Democratie en Ontwikkeling door
Eenheid (Party for Democracy and Development
through Unity)
VVV Volksalliantie voor Vooruitgang (People‘s Alliance
for Progress).
As with most elections in the Americas—and elsewhere—
over the last few decades, the Suriname elections were
4

For a full discussion of the structure and operation of Suriname‘s
political system and some contemporary political aspects, see Dew 1994,
Sedoc-Dahlberg 1997, Singh 2007, and Inter Parliamentary Union at
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Rki69QfL7zgJ:
www.ipu.org/parline/reports/2299.htm+mega+combination+composition
&cd=10&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com.
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monitored by foreign observers. The observers found no
evidence of fraud. Although the Organization of American
States (OAS) team did offer six specific recommendations
for future improvement, their report noted: ―The electoral
process and the election event itself took place in a peaceful
and proper environment and complied with all international
election standards, without any irregularities being
reported.‖5 Similarly, CARICOM monitors indicated:
―Based on our observations, the CARICOM Electoral
Observer Mission is of the view that all was in place, and the
authorities conducted the business of the day freely, fairly
and transparently.‖6
Some 73 percent of the 324,490 eligible voters cast their
votes. The A Combination group won 4.7 percent of the
votes and seven parliamentary seats; BVD, 5.1 percent and
no seats; Mega Combination, 40.2 percent and 23 seats;
NFD, 31.7 percent and 14 seats; PDOE, 5.1 percent and one
seat; and VVV, 13 percent and six seats.7 In Political Science
vernacular that was a plurality outcome and not a majority
one. Since no political party won decisively, coalitionbuilding became necessary. After two months of political
negotiations, on July 19, 2010 Desi Bouterse emerged as
head of the Mega Combination slate and the Ninth President
of the Republic, having fashioned a multi-ethnic coalition
5

OAS, ―Mission to Observe the General Elections In the Republic of
Suriname, May 25, 2010: to OAS Permanent Council, Irene Klinger,
Chief of Mission,‖ Washington, DC, 2010: 4.
6
CARICOM, ―Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Electoral Observer
Mission to Suriname: Preliminary Statement.‖ May 28, 2010, accessed
January 29, 2011,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:W58vnMRUFB
UJ:www.caricom.org/jsp/pressreleases/pres233_10.jsp+Suriname+electi
ons+Caricom+observers&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.g
oogle.com.
Understandably, the results also reflected the plural society nature of the
nation. The National Assembly comprises 17 Hindustani, 11 Creole, 10
Maroon, nine Javanese, two Amerindian, and two Chinese. Interestingly,
as well, 31 of the 51 new parliamentarians were elected for the first time.
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that delivered 36 votes. Robert Ameerali, an Independent
and former head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry,
was elected as Vice President. Ameerali‘s nomination itself
demonstrated Bouterse‘s acumen; it resulted from a deal
stuck with a political nemesis, Ronnie Brunswijk, former
head of a guerrilla group that battled his military regime in
the 1980s, now head of the A Combination group. 8
Even before the final deal was sealed, one sensed a mixture
of muted admiration of Bouterse‘s political acumen and
anxiety about what his victory might portend. For instance,
in June 2010 an editorial in Guyana‘s Stabroek News
captured this mixture thus:
Bouterse is still perceived as a charismatic and
pragmatic man of action and his alliance appealed
to the young and poor with sugary promises for
easy jobs and cheap housing. Memories are short.
The young have no recollection of Bouterse‘s
blotchy record of governance. He seized power in
a coup d‘état in 1980 and left office only under
intense international pressure in 1987 but seized
8

―Legislative Elections of 25 May 2010,‖ Republic of Suriname, 2010,
available at http://psephos.adamcarr.net/countries/s/suriname/suriname2010.txt; Anouska Kock,
―Brunswijk and Bouterse shake hands on Governing Suriname
Together,‖ Abeng Central, June 3, 2010, accessed November 4, 2010,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:yrN5G8fZaKMJ
:abengcentral.wordpress.com/2010/06/03/brunswijk-and-bouterse-shakehands-on-governing-surinametogether/+A+combination+ronnie+brunswijk+2010+suriname&cd=1&hl
=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com; Rory Carroll,
―Suriname President Promises not to Interfere in his own Murder Trial,‖
The Guardian, July 22, 2010, accessed November 2, 2010,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jul/22/suriname-presidentmurder-trial; ―We are More Attracted to Guyana‘—says Bouterse as
Guyana and Suriname Concretize Relations,‖ West Indian News,
September 7, 2010, accessed November 26, 2010,
http://www.thewestindiannews.com/%E2%80%9Cwe-are-moreattracted-to-guyana%E2%80%9D-%E2%80%93-says-bouterse-asguyana-and-suriname-concretise-relations.
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power again in another coup d‘état in 1990. He
still faces criminal charges for his role in the
extra-judicial execution of political opponents in
1982. He was convicted in a court in the
Netherlands for trafficking cocaine from
Suriname to the Netherlands in 1999, but avoided
serving a sentence because both countries prohibit
extradition of each other‘s citizens.
Bouterse‘s party was also part of President Jules
Wijdenbosch‘s 1996 coalition administration. Wijdenbosch embarked on internal policies
which practically bankrupted the country and on
external policies which provoked aggression
against Guyana and defied the Caribbean
Community. It was no surprise, therefore, that the
election results have generated uneasiness and
despondency. Outgoing President Ronald
Venetiaan who leads the minority New Front for
Democracy and Development alliance confirmed
that his group would not work with the
Combinatie as long as Bouterse remained in
control.
Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen said
that the Netherlands respected the will of the
electorate but added that ―the past cannot be
forgotten…Mr. Bouterse has been sentenced to an
11-year prison term in the Netherlands for drug
dealing and, in Suriname, a case about the
murders of December 1982 is still proceeding. We
cannot brush all that away. 9

9

―Suriname‘s Uneasy Elections,‖ Stabroek News, June 1, 2010, accessed
January 20, 2011,
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/editorial/06/01/suriname%25E2%25
80%2599s-uneasy-elections-3/.
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ANXIETY AND GEOPOLITICS
The mixture of awe of Bouterse‘s political acumen and
anxiety about some implications of his triumph has both
internal and external aspects. As one writer put it, Bouterse‘s
victory ―indicates not just how shallow the pool of political
leadership is in Suriname; it's also left many inside and
outside the country wondering if an addiction to the iron fist
still lingers in Latin America.‖10 Moreover, there is curiosity
in some quarters about the likely outcome of Bouterse‘s trial,
including speculation that his presidential quest was partly
intended to foreclose facing justice ultimately.
The concern here is not with the internal aspects, but with
some external ones. Of course, internal and external
dynamics are never entirely divorced, especially when
geopolitics is involved. The concept of geopolitics is defined
here as the relationship between physical and political
geography on the one hand and national power on the other,
with key factors being the possession of strategic materials,
ownership of or access to strategic lanes of communication,
and the possession or location of military bases and other
security installations. Geopolitics provides the context in
which threats and vulnerabilities may develop or be
heightened, or national power enhanced directly or
indirectly.
Free and fair elections, which are essential to democracy,
sometimes result in outcomes that lead to both awkwardness
and anxiety. Such is the case with Desi Bouterse‘s reemergence, as seen at the August 12, 2010 presidential
inauguration, which was not attended by a single foreign
head of state. Initially, two foreign leaders accepted the
inauguration invitation: Presidents Bharat Jagdeo of Guyana
10

Tim Padgett, ―Suriname: The Dictator Who Came in from the Cold.‖
TIME, August 12, 2010, accessed February 21, 2011,
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2009955,00.html.
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and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, two key neighbors.
However, they both skipped the event. The United States
was represented by its ambassador in Paramaribo, John Nay.
Understandably, Holland was not invited to the event, and
they made it known that they would not attend even if
invited. Indeed, said one report, ―When Bouterse was elected
last month Dutch Foreign Minister Maxime Verhagen said in
a statement he would only be welcomed in the Netherlands
to serve his 11 year sentence.‖11
Albert Ramdin, the Suriname-born Assistant Secretary
General of the OAS, who headed the OAS delegation to the
inauguration, captured the awkwardness and anxiety well:
―… the leaders‘ absence was understandable because … it
was not every day that a soldier who has led a coup is later
democratically elected as president.‖ Further, ―In the
Americas some people are still hesitant about Bouterse. They
still do not know how to deal with the situation in Suriname.
Latin American and Caribbean countries will be looking to
see how the policies of President Bouterse‘s government
unfold over the next six months.‖12
It is not feasible to examine all the possible international
anxieties with security ramifications. But it is necessary to
pay some attention to at least three matters: relations with
Guyana, notably in relation to the territorial disputes; illegal

11

―Desi Bouterse Sworn in as Suriname President,‖ Daily Herald.
August 12, 2010, accessed February 20, 2011,
http://www.thedailyherald.com/regional/2-news/6948-desi-boutersesworn-in-as-suriname-president-.html; Ben Fox, ―Suriname Scrutinized
as ex-Dictator Returns,‖ Washington Times, August 12 2010, accessed
January 30, 2011,
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/12/surinamescrutinized-as-ex-dictator-returns/print/.
12
―Frontiers: Why Should Guyana trust Suriname,‖ Stabroek News,
August 31, 2010, accessed November 23, 2010,
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/guyana-review/08/31/frontiers-whyshould-guyana-trust-suriname/.
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drug operations; and foreign policy engagement with
Venezuela.
ON SURINAME’S WESTERN FRONT
Although Guyana‘s governing elites will not openly
acknowledge this, Guyana likely is the nation most nervous
about Bouterse‘s election, and for several reasons: the
existence of a territorial dispute over the New River
Triangle; a recently settled dispute over maritime
boundaries, which once in 2000 saw Suriname‘s use of
military force; and long-standing immigration tensions,
among other things. All of this is in the context of Guyana‘s
weakening defense and diplomatic establishments over the
last decade.
But it also is true that Bouterse regards Guyana as vital to his
foreign policy engagement. Therefore, it was not entirely
surprising that his first international presidential trip was to
Guyana: a one-day working visit on September 6, 201013 that
touched on several matters, including climate change,
information technology, mining, infrastructure development,
energy, agriculture, fisheries, and tertiary education. The
wealth of topics and paucity of concrete deliverables make
for credible speculation that the summit was more about
symbolism than substance. It was noted that ―the JagdeoBouterse encounter‖ … ―was not the first time that Guyana
threw a lifeline to Suriname which was swimming in a sea of
international opprobrium.‖14
13

Bouterse fell ill with dengue fever shortly before the visit but he
insisted on making the trip even though he had not fully recovered.
14
―Suriname Desperately seeks Acceptability,‖ September 30, 2010,
accessed November 26, 2010,
http://www.stabroeknews.com/2010/guyanareview/frontiers/09/30/suriname-desperately-seeks-acceptability/. As
evidence, it has been noted ―President Desmond Hoyte had agreed to a
similar ‗working visit‘ by President Johannes Kraag in January 1991 at
Plantation Skeldon on the Corentyne. Mr. Kraag has recently been
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During the visit Bouterse declared ―Suriname is at a
crossroads now and we want to share new ideas with
Guyana. We have a special movement and aspiration
towards South America and the Caribbean.‖15 President
Bouterse visited again two months later, on November 20,
2010, this time to Berbice, which borders Suriname, rather
than the capital, Georgetown. Jagdeo reciprocated on
November 20, 2010, to Nickerie and not the capital,
Paramaribo.16 Bouterse visited Guyana again on February
26, 2011, on the way back to Suriname after attending the
CARICOM Summit in Grenada.17

installed by Suriname‘s National Army‘s Acting Commander Ivan
Graanoogst—then Bouterse‘s trusted deputy—after the 24th December
1990 ‗Telephone Coup.‘ Two days after Bouterse‘s resignation as Army
Commander, the Army telephoned President Ramsewak Shankar to
inform him that he and his cabinet had been removed from office.‖
15
―‗We are More Attracted to Guyana‘—says Bouterse as Guyana and
Suriname Concretize Relations,‖ West Indian News, 2010. (See also
―Suriname Desperately seeks Acceptability,‖ Straboek News, 2010, about
the visit overall).
16
―Absence of Foreign Ministry in talks with Suriname Criticized,‖
Demerarawaves, November 20, 2010, accessed November 26, 2010,
http://www.demerarawaves.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=232:absence-of-foreign-ministry-in-talks-with-surrinamecriticized-&catid=1&Itemid=20. Jagdeo‘s November visit generated
criticism because of the team‘s composition. Foreign Minister Carolyn
Rodrigues-Birkett was notably absent, although her counterpart, Winston
Lackin, was part of Bouterse‘s delegation. Included in Jagdeo‘s team was
Donald Ramotar, MP and General Secretary of the ruling People‘s
Progressive Party (PPP). Criticism came both from opposition parties and
from within the PPP, as Ramotar was contending for the party
presidential nomination for the forthcoming elections. Jagdeo had taken
Ramotar on other foreign trips, using state funds. Other PPP hopefuls
viewed such as competitively advantaging him, both in signaling
―anointment‖ as successor and in offering him foreign policy experience.
Unsurprisingly, in April 2011 Ramotar was named the candidate.
17
―Bouterse makes brief stop-over,‖ Newspress, March 2, 2011, accessed
March 2, 2011, http://www.guyanesenews.com/news/bouterse-makesbrief-stop-over. The two leaders reportedly discussed bridging of the
Corentyne River, crime, immigration, and regularizing the river-boat
system between the two nations.
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The matter of a ―lifeline‖ surfaced again in January 2011
when President Jagdeo dropped a bombshell at the Guyana
Defense Force senior leadership conference in declaring: ―A
foreign mission asked us if we will arrest the president of
Suriname when he comes here because he is wanted
somewhere else, and I said to them ‗No‘.‖18 Jagdeo declined
to name the nation involved, but his revelation generated
understandable speculation about what country had made the
request. This led the United States to issue a statement
through its embassy in Georgetown distancing itself from the
matter.
At the end of the day, any ―life-lining‖ in Guyana‘s dealing
with Suriname and the geopolitical anxiety occasioned by
Bouterse‘s election are driven by what in essence is the
elephant in the room for both nations—the territorial issues
and the attendant political heat they generate domestically.
There are two sets of issues: one is about land—the
unresolved New River Triangle; the other pertains to the
maritime dispute that was resolved in 2007 but still has some
residual aspects. Figure 1 shows the two areas.
The New River Triangle dispute, which involves 15,540 km2
(6,000 square miles) of territory, dates to the 19th century.
The area is resource-rich, with timber and minerals and
indications of the presence of bauxite and aluminum. The
Border Mixed Commission, established in 1989 as a
framework for rapprochement and to move the parties
progressively towards resolution, has been dormant for
several years. Meanwhile, over the last few decades there
have been many diplomatic and security twists and turns in

18

―Guyana was asked about arresting Suriname‘s President,‖
Demerarawaves, January 25, 2011, accessed January 26, 2011,
http://www.demerarawaves.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=
article&id=585:guyana-was-asked-about-arresting-surinamespresident&catid=18:security&Itemid=59.
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the territorial saga.19 Perhaps the most significant—and
daring—development was Suriname‘s presenting to the
world what it had long done within Suriname:
cartographically portraying the area as part of its territory.
Figure 1 – Guyana-Suriname Disputed Areas

Source: Donovan 200320

19

For a discussion of the historical antecedents and legal and political
dynamics of this dispute, see Donovan 2003, Ferguson 2007, Pollard
2007, and Stabroek News 2010c.
20
Thomas Donovan, ―Suriname-Guyana Maritime and Territorial
Disputes: A Legal and Historical Analysis,‖ Journal of Transnational
Law and Policy, Vol. 23 Spring, 2003, 41-98.

14

The occasion was the World Bank Low Carbon
Development Strategy Forum held in October 2009 in
Washington, DC. Suriname upped the ante by including in
its submission the map shown in Figure 2. 21 (See
http://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/fcp/Node/175.)
Figure 2 – Suriname Redefined by Suriname

Source: Suriname’s Presentation to the World Bank Low Carbon
Development Forum, October 2009.

Guyana‘s feeble protest of this audacious move and its
inability to secure a retraction of the map reflect its relative
diplomatic (and military) ineffectiveness. 22
More
21

―An Unfortunate Map Display,‖ Guyana Chronicle, November 6,
2002, accessed March 3, 2011,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:jOV3Ag2LYbA
J:www.landofsixpeoples.com/news022/nc21106.htm+jagdeo+visit+surin
ame+2002+parliament+map&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=ww
w.google.com. It is worth nothing that Jagdeo allowed himself to be
humiliated in January 2002 when, as part of an official visit to Suriname,
he was invited to address the National Assembly and he spoke from a
position in the Assembly where the map of Suriname with the New River
Triangle as part of Suriname was part of the backdrop.
22
I mention military effectiveness not to suggest that military measures
should have been used but because in the international arena—whether
for big, medium, or small states—the possession of military assets and

15

significantly, Suriname‘s bold chess move has set the stage
for eventual de facto acceptance internationally of its
cartographic definition of the nation, irrespective of the
status of the dispute or the de jure ownership of Triangle.
My prediction is that now that Suriname‘s definition of itself
had an international début, especially having been presented
at a World Bank forum, it will be reproduced and used by
others and, by default, slowly will become the geographic
definition of Suriname in the eyes of the world. This is all
the more so since Suriname recently began to depict itself as
inclusive of the New River Triangle on the web site of its
embassy in Washington, DC. 23
The maritime zone‘s geopolitical value in terms of resources
is perhaps greater than the New River Triangle‘s given the
hydrocarbons there. One study notes that:
The disputed maritime area between Guyana and
Suriname, called the Guyana Basin, is an underexplored area on the continental shelf of South
America extending from present day Venezuela to
Suriname. The Guyana Basin is geographically
next to Trinidad and Venezuela, both important
oil producers on the Caribbean plateau and the
Venezuelan extension, which are two large and
productive oil fields. Throughout this area, large
commercial petroleum consortiums such as
Exxon, Agip, and Burlington have successfully
drilled for petroleum.

sometimes just the perception of that possession—even without the use
of gunboat diplomacy—can influence outcomes as national interests are
pursued, especially when such fundamental interests as territorial
possession (or the definition of it) are involved.
23
See http://www.surinameembassy.org/. This is a variation of
Venezuela‘s approach where it portrays Essequibo, the five-eighths of
Guyana it claims, as part of its territory but as Zona en reclamación. See,
for example,
http://www.venezuelatuya.com/geografia/mapavenezuela.htm.
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Limited exploration in the Guyana Basin has been
carried out to date. However in June 2000, the
United States Geological Survey‘s World
Petroleum Assessment 2000 estimated that the
resource potential for the Guyana Basin is 15.2
billion barrels of oil. This estimate indicates that
the Guyana Basin is the second most important
unexplored region in the world in terms of oil
potential. If the potential is reached, it would be
the twelfth most productive site in the world.24

The zone in question was 31,600 km2 (5,251 square miles) in
size. The dispute has witnessed several dramatic high points,
perhaps the most notable of which was the ejection in June
2000 by Suriname Defense Force naval vessels of the oil
platforms of a Canadian-owned company, CGX, which had
been licensed by Guyana to drill in the Guyana Basin. The
episode witnessed the humiliation of the Guyana Defense
Force—once larger and better trained than the Suriname
Defense Force. One report also noted: ―To add insult to
injury, Paramaribo had deployed its naval vessels in the area
in a show of strength, declared itself ‗the power in the river‘
and led Georgetown on a meaningless diplomatic waltz
which ended on 18 June, with the then Foreign Minister
Clement Rohee conceding failure in his quest to restore the
status quo ante. The next year, Mr. Rohee was removed from
the ministry.‖25
Interestingly, Suriname‘s use of force was itself a
manifestation of Intermestic dynamics. Up until early May
2000, about a year after CGX began its exploration in the
area, Surinamese authorities voiced no concern about the
presence or purpose of CGX in the Basin. Things began to
24
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change later that month as the campaign for the impending
elections—set for May 25—heated up. Opposition figures
began accusing the ruling coalition of condoning Guyana‘s
intrusion into ―Surinamese territory‖ and plundering its oil
wealth. As Shridath Ramphal put it, ―political machoism was
stirring the nationalist plot; and the Government was not
going to be outdone.‖26 On May 11, Suriname delivered a
Note Verbale27 to Guyana through Guyana‘s ambassador in
Paramaribo, demanding that Guyana cease operations in
what it deemed its territory.
Guyana replied asserting that the exploration was being
undertaken within its maritime space. Suriname ignored
Guyana‘s response and found it politically expedient not to
acknowledge having received it. The May 25, 2000 elections
resulted in a loss of power for the ruling coalition and victory
for the New Front coalition, although it was sometime before
the new National Assembly elected a president. Then on
May 31, with the new president not yet agreed on,
Suriname‘s foreign minister—whose president had just lost
power—issued a new Note Verbale to Guyana‘s ambassador.
It re-asserted its allegation about Guyana‘s illegal actions,
demanded immediate cessation of activities, and promised to
use ―all avenues‖ if Guyana did not comply with its
demands.
Simultaneously, Suriname ordered CGX to cease operations
or face appropriate sanctions. Guyana replied to the May 31
Note Verbale on June 2, offering to host high-level talks
within 24 hours. That same day Guyana Defense Force Coast
Guard patrolling the Guyana Basin near the rigs reported
Surinamese military aircraft flying threateningly over the rig
26

Shridath Ramphal, Triumph for UNCLOS: The Guyana-Suriname
Maritime Arbitration: A Compilation and Commentary, (London: Hansib
Publishers, 2008), 146.
27
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and Coast Guard vessels. Guyana protested the airspace
intrusion and renewed the offer to hold talks, to no avail. Just
after midnight on June 3 the Surinamese navy arrived in the
CGX concession area, circled the rig, trained spotlights on
the platform and ordered: ―leave the area within 12 hours, or
the consequences will be yours.‖28 Understandably fearful
for their physical safety and destruction of their equipment,
the CGX operators detached the rigs and left under naval
escort. Suriname also forced Esso and Maxus to end their oil
operations in the Basin.
The affair also highlighted CARICOM‘s limitations as a
dispute-resolution mechanism. CARICOM tried but failed to
resolve the disagreement between two of its members.
Guyana then took the matter to arbitration under the United
Nations Convention of the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) in
February 2004. The case took three years, with the
composition of the five-member Tribunal alone taking nine
months. Both sides mounted formidable teams of
international lawyers, geographers, and diplomats. Guyana
had a 21-member team, and Suriname a 25-member team.
(For details of the two teams, see Ramphal, Triumph for
UNCLOS, 341-342).29 Suriname challenged the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal and the validity of the established
international legal principle of equidistance in fixing
boundaries, and it attempted to justify the June 3, 2000 use
of force.

28

Ramphal, Triumph for UNCLOS, 149.
CGX paid most of Guyana‘s legal bill. According to one report,
―Toronto-based CGX Energy Inc. paid $8.9 million in fees--the majority
of Guyana's legal bill--incurred in a maritime border dispute with
Suriname over rights to the undersea basin, President Bharrat Jagdeo said
late Monday. ‗This is no secret,‘Jagdeo told reporters outside his offices
Georgetown. ‗I'm very grateful to CGX for footing the bill, because it
didn't come from the treasury. But that doesn't mean that they have any
preferences.‘‖ Associated Press, 2007.
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Not only did that strategy fail in the extant case but it
facilitated the strengthening of ―the Constitution of the
Oceans‖ in relation to future cases. Says Ramphal: ―In all
three areas, the Tribunal in this case made decisions of major
significance not only to the outcome of the Arbitration, but
also to the development of international law generally. The
Guyana-Suriname Maritime Award is likely to be an arbitral
precedent much drawn upon in international jurisprudence in
years ahead.‖30 The Tribunal announced the Award on
September 20, 2007: two-thirds of the disputed zone to
Guyana and one-third to Suriname. Beyond this, Guyana felt
vindicated in relation to the June 2000 use of force with the
Tribunal‘s declaration: ―As a result of this Award, Guyana
now has undisputed title to the area where the incident
occurred.‖31
As with other dispute settlement cases, the Tribunal‘s
decision did not remove all frictions. On October 14, 2008,
Suriname seized the Lady Chanrda, a privately –owned
Guyanese boat on the Corentyne River.32 Nevertheless, the
30

Ramphal, Triumph for UNCLOS, 17. Suriname also pursued a ―denial
of access‖ strategy. Although Guyana and Britain allowed Suriname
unlimited access to all historical archives, Suriname sought to deny
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(Ramphal 2008, 222)
31
For the case‘s historical, political, and legal dynamics, see Ramphal,
2008, 17. Shridath Ramphal is an international lawyer with a
distinguished career: former Attorney General and then Foreign Minister
of Guyana under Forbes Burnham (founder of the opposition PNCR),
former Commonwealth Secretary General, and former Chancellor of both
the University of the West Indies and the University of Guyana. He led
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settlement enabled resumption of oil exploration by CGX.
Joining later was Tullow Oil, a British company, in a joint
venture with REPSOL of Spain. Indications are that
production could begin as early as 2014. 33
It is reasonable to suggest that given the sensitivity in the
Americas to how territorial disputes are dealt with—partly
because of wars caused by them and because of the large
number of existing disputes—it is not just Guyana that
would be concerned about Bouterse‘s conduct vis-à-vis
territorial matters. But it also is true that Bouterse‘s election
has created international anxiety about other matters,
including illegal drug operations.
ON THE GEONARCOTICS FRONT
This writer originated the concept of ―geonarcotics‖ in the
early 1990s as a way to examine the drug phenomenon
holistically. I first outlined it in 1993 in Canada‘s
International Journal and later applied it empirically in a
study on the Caribbean.34 The concept suggests the dynamic
interaction of four factors: narcotics, geography, power, and
politics; that the narcotics phenomenon is multidimensional,
with four main problem areas (drug production,
consumption-abuse, trafficking, and money laundering); that
these problem areas give rise to actual and potential threats
to the security of states; and that drug operations and the
activities they spawn precipitate both conflict and
33
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cooperation among various state and non-state actors. The
geonarcotics approach does not view the "war on drugs"
purely as a military matter.
Apart from Bouterse‘s conviction, his son and several senior
military officials have been implicated in narcotics
smuggling. In 1986 Etienne Boerenven, then the Suriname
Defense Force‘s second in command, was arrested in Miami,
convicted of drug trafficking and sentenced. He was
deported from Florida in May 1991 after serving five years
of a 12-year prison sentence. In March 1998, Ronnie
Brunswijk, a former Bouterse bodyguard who later became
his nemesis, was convicted of drug trafficking in Holland
and sentenced in absentia to eight years in prison.35
In April 1999, Brazil's TV Globo reported allegations that
Rupert Christopher, Suriname's ambassador in Brazil and a
former Defense Minister under Bouterse, was implicated in
the drug trade with Bouterse. Earlier that year, Bouterse's
son, Dino, reportedly was recalled from Suriname's embassy
in Brazil after authorities found evidence that he had been
using his diplomatic immunity to smuggle drugs. In August
1999 Interpol issued an international arrest warrant on
Belgium‘s behalf for Ruben Peiter, commander of the
Suriname police mobile unit. Belgium suspected that Peiter
was shipping cocaine in timber consignments. In August
2005 Dino Bouterse was convicted in Paramaribo and
sentenced to eight years in prison for trafficking in drugs and
weapons. He secured an early release.36
35
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This profile suggests that as regards the matter of drugs, the
international spotlight likely will be more on trafficking and
less on production, consumption-abuse, and money
laundering, although these three aspects are important. In
relation to money laundering, for example, a director of the
Suriname Central Bank once was indicted (in absentia in
Holland) for money-laundering.37
Marijuana is cultivated in Suriname, although mostly for
domestic consumption. But Suriname produces no cocaine,
heroin, or methamphetamines, which feature prominently in
trafficking there, as shown in the Appendix.
Like
everywhere else—including in the United States—that what
is seized is a mere fraction of what is trafficked. Thus, an
understandable question in terms of geonarcotics is: what
explains Suriname‘s deep involvement in trafficking? As
with any nation so involved, there is no single-factor
explanation. Corruption, economic deprivation, and law
enforcement resource constraints are relevant factors.
Nevertheless, geography is a major factor, and in several
respects.
Location! Location! Location! Suriname is just a ―stone‘s
throw‖ away from Colombia, a major cocaine and heroin
production (and marijuana cultivation) center. It also is close
to Venezuela, a major drug conduit, and it shares a 600 kmborder with Guyana and a 593 km-border with Brazil, both
of which feature prominently in drug transshipment from
; Gary Brana-Shute, ―Narco-Criminality in the Caribbean,‖ in Ivelaw L.
Griffith, ed., The Political Economy of Drugs in the Caribbean, (London:
Macmillan Press, 2000), 97-112; Ank Kuipers, ―Suriname MPs elect
Strongman as President,‖ Star Online, July 20, 2010, accessed March 5,
2011,
http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:kylTZFLNurUJ:
thestar.com.my/news/story.asp%3Ffile%3D/2010/7/20/worldupdates/201
0-07-20T035108Z_01_NOOTR_RTRMDNC_0_-5024711%26sec%3DWorldupdates+dino+bouterse+trafficking+2005&cd=7&hl
=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&source=www.google.com.
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South America to the United States, Europe, and Africa,
often for re-routing to Europe and the United States. Also,
Suriname is less than 3,000 miles away from most places in
the United States, a key demand country. Although it is
further away from key drug demand countries in Europe—
4,659 miles from Amsterdam, and 4,437 miles from London,
for instance—there are commercial and social networks in
those countries that make the trafficking journeys
worthwhile for the illegal operators.38
Yet, is not merely a matter of physical geography; social
geography also is a factor. Suriname has 163,270 square
kilometers of territory; it is about the same size of the state
of Georgia in the United States, with a little fewer than 10
million people. Thus, Suriname has a very low population
density and the population lives mostly along the coast.
Consequently most of the nation‘s territory is both underpeopled and under-policed. This combination provides
vulnerability to drug trafficking (and other illegal activities)
as well as opportunity for traffickers and other illegal
operators.
Thus, a second understandable geonarcotics question is this:
In light of the factors described above, is Bouterse likely to
establish a narco-state?39 This salience of this question
increased for some individuals with the January 2011
WikiLeaks cable revelation. It was alleged that United States
embassy officials in Suriname had filed reports to
38

See Griffith, Drugs and Security in the Caribbean, 57-62 for data on
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headquarters that Bouterse had continued his drug dealings
even after his 1999 conviction, supposedly until 2006, when
he still was a member of parliament, and that some of his
ventures involved links with Guyanese Roger Khan. 40As
noted in the Appendix, in October 2009 Khan was sentenced
to 40 years in prison in New York having been convicted on
drug trafficking and related charges.
Clearly, with unemployment almost 10 percent, per capita
GDP being under US$10,000, and three-quarters of the
population engaged in the low-wage service sector,
economic deprivation is still a major challenge for Suriname.
Indeed, as noted earlier, Bouterse won partly because of a
pledge to improve the economic and social conditions of
Surinamese. It is true that the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) predicts a five percent economic growth this year. 41
But, corruption still exists, and the conditions that conduce to
it are unlikely to be eliminated in the near future. Moreover,
the economic, political, and geographic conditions of
proximate countries such as Guyana, Venezuela, and Brazil
are not such as to reduce their contribution to Suriname‘s
vulnerability to trafficking.
For all this, I do not envisage the creation of a narco-state in
Suriname, and for several reasons. First, the very political
acumen that helped Bouterse re-emerge legitimately should
enable him to appreciate the inexpediency of such a pursuit.
Such would hurt both his political self-interest as a world
leader and the national interests of his nation. Second,
Bouterse must know of the special spotlight both he and
40
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Suriname now are under. Thus, he is more likely to try to
compensate for his history and negative image by being
aggressive against trafficking than to become complicit
(again) in it. Perhaps we already are seeing the makings of
this with the quest for international assistance from Britain,
the Netherlands, Bulgaria, Pakistan, and elsewhere.42 Finally,
although Bouterse is in good health, he is in a chronological
zone—age 65—when leaders begin to ponder both their
mortality and their legacy. 43 He must know that enabling the
development of a narco-state would damage his legacy.
Consider, though, that even if President Bouterse were to
compensate for his drug trafficking history and image by
being aggressive against traffickers he might well want to
establish an external legacy outside the geonarcotics arena.
The foreign policy arena can plausibly be that desired legacy
area. In such a case, for understandable reasons, his primary
zone of engagement would have to be the Caribbean, Brazil,
and Venezuela, although Europe and the United States will
continue to be important for trade, aid, and immigration.44
As was noted earlier, in his first international trip—to
Guyana in September 2010—Bouterse declared having ―a
special movement and aspiration towards South America and
the Caribbean.‖45 Indeed, as part of its South American
engagement, Suriname joined UNASUR (Unión de Naciones
42
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Suramericanas or Union of South American Nations) in
January 2011.46 It is in that context that we turn next to some
dynamics related to a possible Venezuelan embrace.
ON THE VENEZUELAN FRONT
A Venezuelan embrace of Suriname now that Bouterse is
president is underway. This is explained by a few secondary
factors and one primary one. One secondary factor is the fact
that both Desi Bouterse and Hugo Chavez are political
mavericks, and perhaps bond at that level. Moreover, there is
ostensibly an ideological affinity, as they both are left of the
ideological spectrum. However, clearly Bouterse no longer
has the strident left orientation he had during the 1980s and
1990s, when the overall ideological climate in the
hemisphere and beyond was different. It is true that
Suriname recognized the State of Palestine in February 2011,
and hosted Chen Fengxiang, vice head of the Communist
Party of China the following month.47
Nevertheless, Bouterse seems not interested in ideology but
in pragmatism. For example, in outlining his five-year policy
projections in the National Assembly in October 2010, he
declared: ―Our foreign policy will be aimed at Suriname
agricultural produce gaining access to Caribbean markets.
We will pursue a more intensive cooperation with Cuba in
educating doctors, in order to bring health care within reach
of each Surinamese. We will work more closely with
46
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Venezuela as regards the further development of our oil
sector, with Japan and Korea on the fisheries sector, with the
USA and Canada in the mining sector, and with India in the
area of ICT.‖48 Interestingly, Cuba and Suriname established
diplomatic relation in 1979 but after the United States
invasion of Grenada in 1983 those relations were frozen until
1995. Cuba reopened an embassy in Paramaribo in 2006 and
Suriname reopened one in Havana in January 2010, several
months before Bouterse assumed the presidency.
Understandably, this does not mean that Chavez might not
wish for ideological stridency, or that Bouterse can totally
escape the embrace having accepted Chavez‘s largesse
during the 2010 elections campaign. Moreover, anxiety in
some quarters within Suriname about Venezuelan influence
led one group, called ―No Murderers for President,‖ to begin
protesting alleged interference. They even wrote to all
UNASUR members, except Venezuela, of course, about
this.49
What, then, is the primary explanatory factor in Suriname‘s
Venezuelan embrace under Desi Bouterse? That factor is
national interest. Suriname finds it expedient to enhance its
relationship with Venezuela as part of its South American
thrust, and because of aid and oil—both to acquire the latter
on concessionary terms and get technical assistance for its
own oil industry. For its part, Venezuela considers it in its
national interest to expand its zone of influence by using oil,
part of its Bolivarian strategy. The instrument for this is
48
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PetroCaribe. Chavez announced Suriname‘s inclusion in
PetroCaribe while on a five-hour visit to Suriname on
November 26, 2010. He also signed agreements on
agriculture and housing. Venezuela will also supply
fertilizers for Suriname‘s rice sector and the two will pursue
a joint venture on rice farming. As well, they also will
provide an undisclosed number of prefabricated houses to
Suriname.50
PetroCaribe itself was established in 2005 under
Venezuela‘s PetroCaribe Energy Agreement and finances a
portion of the value of imports of Venezuelan crude oil on a
sliding scale: above $30 per barrel, 25%; above $40, 30%;
above 50, 40%; and above $100, 50%. Participating
countries pay the balance over 25 years at two percent
interest rate, which reduces to one percent at prices above
$40 per barrel along with a two-year repayment grace
period.51 It operates under six key terms:
1. Oil sold at concessionary terms.
2. Only part of the payment is paid in cash up front. The
rest is converted into a loan, used for development
purposes, to be repaid in 25 years at one or two percent
interest.
3. No conditions are attached to the loans.
4. Portions of the loan can be repaid in the form of goods or
services.
5. No private entities are permitted; all transactions are
done on a state-to-state basis.
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6. Transportation, docking facilities, and upgrades to
refining and storage capabilities are included. 52
As of March 2011 the following 17 countries were
PetroCaribe participants: Antigua and Barbuda, the
Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Dominica, the Dominican Republic,
Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Nicaragua, Suriname, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, and St.
Vincent and the Grenadines. They receive about 145,000
barrels daily, down from the 300,000 barrels initially
envisaged, with some 95,000 barrels going to Cuba alone.
This list of nations is not all leftist in orientation. So,
although PetroCaribe is manifestly a part of Hugo Chavez‘s
Bolivarian strategy, the participating nations are drawn to it
not because of ideological affinity with Chavez but for
pragmatic national interest reasons.53 Anthony Maingot‘s
assessment is, therefore, fully supportable: ―This is the main
lesson learned from Venezuela‘s efforts in the region:
countries will seldom turn down economic assistance when
they need it, but how they respond politically to that
assistance will depend on their own political culture and
realties.‖
Yet, there are risks, especially for those Eastern Caribbean
nations with monocultural economies and, thus, greater
economic vulnerability. This vulnerability was accentuated
in early 2011 by developments in the Middle East, which
drove the price of oil up considerably. As of March 2011 the
price of crude topped $US 115 per barrel and was expected
to rise further if the situation is not ameliorated soon.
52
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Reliance on PetroCaribe likely will increase and so too
possibly Venezuela‘s influence. At least Suriname has a
more diversified economy, including some oil production,
and can resist some pressures if it feels such are not
consonant with its national interests in ways Dominica, St.
Lucia, and others are less able to do. Further, Suriname is
not—yet, at least—part of ALBA.
As Maingot points out, Hugo Chavez‘s strategy is about
creating alternatives ―to U.S. imperialism, capitalism (in its
neoliberal, free trade, and privatization dimensions), and
traditional oligarchies (often defined in racial terms).‖ 54 My
worry, then, is that as middle-power Venezuela pursues its
―great game‖ against hyper-power United States small
Caribbean nations might become collateral victims.
Geopolitically, ALBA and the Bolivarian strategy highlight
several political and economic vulnerabilities of Caribbean
countries, in relation to CARICOM and the United States,
which is the Venezuela‘s nemesis. It is this context that the
re-emergence of Bouterse and the strengthening of relations
with Venezuela have raised geopolitical anxieties.
Nevertheless, so far all indications are that Suriname‘s
pursuits are guided by pragmatism and national interest
rather than left ideological affinity. In this respect,
Bouterse‘s articulation of his Development Diplomacy
approach in the National Assembly in October 2010 bears
noting:
The realization of the national development goals
will be central in our interactions with other
countries and international organizations, mindful
of the policy principle that foreign policy must
contribute to national development. The foreign
policy will serve to support sectors that are central
to the national development, such as agriculture
and mining, education, health care, rural
54
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development,
poverty
alleviation
and
environmental protection. With regard to
Suriname this implies a reorientation of the regular
diplomacy to a development-oriented diplomacy,
with more attention being paid to new subjects
such as poverty alleviation, food security, the
protection of upcoming business and industries,
and the impact of climate change. In this concept
the contribution of recognized NGOs and
Surinamese will be of great value in the Diaspora.
This development diplomacy will be aimed at
optimizing effectiveness and productivity of
international cooperation on behalf of national
development.55

CONCLUSION
Suriname is clearly at a crossroads partly because the major
outcome of the 2010 elections has caused some geopolitical
anxieties—in Guyana with which there is a territorial
dispute, regarding drug trafficking, and vis-à-vis Venezuela.
This is essentially because of the triumph of erstwhile
authoritarian ruler and convicted drug trafficker Désiré Desi
Bouterse who made good use of his political acumen to reemerge as the nation‘s chief political helmsman, this time
legitimately.
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Yet, it is important to bear in mind the broader context of
political adaptation and democracy in the extant case.
Samuel Huntington reminds us that: ―Elections, open, free,
and fair, are the essence of democracy, the inescapable sine
qua non. Governments produced by elections may be
inefficient, corrupt, shortsighted, irresponsible, dominated by
special interests, and incapable of adopting policies
demanded by the public good. These qualities may make
such governments undesirable but they do not make them
undemocratic.‖56 There is every reason to hope that not only
will Suriname sustain its democratic trajectory but that the
government of President Desi Bouterse will pursue such
domestic and international policies and programs as to make
his government desirable within the country and embraced as
a valuable member of the regional and global comity of
nations.

56

Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies, (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 9-10.
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APPENDIX
Drug Trafficking Portrait of Suriname 2006-2010
Year
2006

Seizures and Arrests

2007

206 kg of cocaine, 131 kg of cannabis, 3,154 ecstasy
tablets, and 81 grams of ecstasy powder. A total of
667 people were arrested for drug-related offenses
and 462 cases were sent to the Office of the
Attorney General for prosecution. While the cocaine
seizures are far below 2006‘s the decrease is
attributed to the establishment of the Airport

577 kilograms (kg) of cocaine and 42 kg of
cannabis; 571 persons were arrested for drug-related
offenses. While seizures and arrests decreased
compared to 2005, this is due to the government‘s
focus on targeting major traffickers. Within the last
five years authorities have rounded up eight of the
ten known major criminal organizations. Through
September authorities arrested 112 people carrying
cocaine in their stomachs. Many who evade
detection in Suriname were arrested at the airport in
Amsterdam, which since 2004 has implemented a
100 percent inspection of all passengers and baggage
arriving from Suriname. In a major success
Guyanese Shaheed "Roger" Khan, suspected of drug
trafficking, was arrested on false documents charges.
He was set to return to Guyana via Trinidad and
Tobago, but was deported, instead, to the United
States. [Khan was later convicted in New York and
sentenced in October 2009 to 40 years for drug
smuggling and illegal arms possession. Two months
later his attorney, Robert Simels, was given 14 years
for trying to kill witnesses. See Griffith 2009, 16.]
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Narcotics Team and anti-narcotics training provided
for customs and police officers, which forced
traffickers to develop alternatives to getting drugs
through the airport.

2008

228.1 kg of cocaine, 123 kg of cannabis, 785 ecstasy
tablets and 3,346.4 grams of heroin. While 2008
seizures were on par with previous year, authorities
continued targeting large trafficking rings, (with
direct links to South American and European rings).
United States intelligence shows that traffickers
have changed their routes and methods of operations
in response to the efforts of Surinamese authorities.
Drug trafficking organizations have moved their
landing strips further into the interior and changed
trafficking tactics, such as using one landing strip for
a very short period of time and then moving to
another strip. A total of 582 people were arrested on
drug-related offenses. The authorities also noted a
slight decrease in the number of drug mules arrested,
from 99 in 2007 to 66 in 2008. Traffickers continued
the use of postal services to mail packages
containing household items or foodstuff (ginger
roots, noodles, and syrup) containing drugs. There
was a notable increase of African nationals arrested
at Suriname‘s Johan Adolf Pengel airport carrying
drugs intended for Africa, through Holland. The
most significant arrest trend in 2008 was the arrest
of several members of different Surinamese
entertainment groups.

2009

238.2 kilograms of cocaine, 158.5 kilograms of
cannabis, 4,711.2 grams of hash, and 5.8 grams of
heroin. In the second half of 2009 Suriname
launched Operation Koetai, which focused
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interdiction on the border with Guyana. This
operation resulted in 94.1 kilos of cocaine seize and
eight arrests as of October 30. People who attempted
to bypass Operation Koetai by landing their boats in
the district of Saramacca also were apprehended,
resulting in seven additional arrests and the seizure
of 77.5 kilos of cocaine. Operation Koetai forced an
increase in the market price of cocaine from $3,500
to $7,000 per kilo in the area. During the year,
Suriname installed a urine testing machine at the
airport to identify suspected drug mules and
introduced three Dutch-trained dogs to detect drugs
on Amsterdam-bound flights. This enhanced effort
may have contributed to the downward trend in the
number of drug mules arrested—from 99 in 2007, to
66 in 2008, to 49 in 2009. One Surinamese drug
mule was arrested at the airport in Holland after
having swallowed 182 cocaine capsules, weighing
nearly 2.2 kilos. Although the majority of the
trafficking out of Suriname via the airport occurs
mainly on Netherlands-bound flights, drugs also
were intercepted on the US-bound flights in Trinidad
and Tobago, Jamaica, and the United States. For
example, drugs were discovered on a US-bound
Suriname Airways flight by US Customs in Aruba.
Nationalities arrested in Suriname in 2009 for drugrelated offenses included Filipinos, Spaniards,
Dutch, Guyanese, Belgians, British, Brazilians,
Ghanaians,
Columbians,
Venezuelans,
and
Nigerians. As of October 30 that year 454 people
were arrested for drug-related offenses of which 323
cases were sent for prosecution. As of November 5
of the year, 293 people had been prosecuted for
drug-related offenses.
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2010

342.7 kg of cocaine, 32.5 liters of liquid cocaine,
146 kg of marijuana, 4.5 grams of hashish, and 2
grams of heroin. During 2010, 542 people were
arrested for drug-related offenses, compared to 454
arrests in 2009. Suriname authorities focused
significant interdiction resources on the western
border with Guyana, a key route for cocaine
trafficking by land, air, and water. In 2010 this effort
yielded limited success, with fewer interdictions
than in 2009. One officer posted at this checkpoint
was arrested on corruption charges and this
investigation is ongoing. A downward trend
continued in the number of drug mules arrested—
from 99 in 2007, to 66 in 2008, to 49 in 2009, to 34
in 2010. The use of foodstuff to move drugs out of
Suriname continued in 2010, with cocaine
discovered in prunes, dried fish, souvenirs, and
syrup bottles. The bulk of the cocaine movement out
of Suriname to Europe and Africa is via commercial
sea cargo, including both larger boats and smaller
fishing vessels that carry drugs out to sea and
transfer them to larger freight vessels in international
waters. There were several drug seizures in 2010 of
cocaine found in sea cargo originating from
Suriname, including: 166 kilos from a container at
the port of Tilbury in the United Kingdom, where
the drugs were concealed within industrial
machinery parts; 266 kilos discovered by Pakistani
Customs at the port of Karachi in the shipping
container of plywood; and 147 kilos of liquid
cocaine discovered by Dutch Customs officials,
concealed within a cargo container of syrup.

Source: U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report; various years.
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